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I. INTRODUCTION
For almost two decades there has been no draft in the United
States. All who have entered the military have volunteered to do so.'
Even when there has been a draft, many-indeed, most-citizens are
exempt or deferred from service.2 Whether or not these exemptions
and deferments are equitable is a matter of continuing debate. What
is clear, however, is that in many instances, those who are exempt or
deferred at least have the right, if they choose, to volunteer for
service.
This Article focuses on one group of individuals-homosexu-
als-who are denied that choice. These citizens were, and continue to
be, excluded from military service, no matter how much they wish to
enlist, how attractive they find the benefits, or how much they desire
the responsibilities and affirmation of citizenship that military service
confers. The Article begins by describing the military's policy of
excluding homosexuals from service and how it has evolved, espe-
cially over the course of the past ten years. Current policy is not
merely a relic of an outmoded past; it has been actively shaped by
recent developments in politics and the law.3 The Article then goes
* Professor of Political Science, Florida International University.
1. See JUDITH H. STIEHM, ARMS AND THE ENLISTED WOMAN 32 (1989) (table 2.1).
2. See NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON SELECTIVE SERVICE, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY:
WHO SERVES WHEN NOT ALL SERVE? 3, 37 (1967). Conscientious objectors, students,
agricultural workers or others working in special occupations (for example, inner-city
teachers), those who possessed an "extreme hardship," "sufficient" prior service, or a child, or
those who were "sole surviving sons," elected officials, or ministers or divinity students were
among those exempted or deferred from military service during the Vietnam War. Id. at 18
(chart 4). In addition, men under 19 or over 25, and all women, were exempt. Id. at 17, 19.
3. See THEODORE R. SARBIN & KENNETH E. KAROLS, DEFENSE PERSONNEL
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on to consider the justifications offered for the policy, concluding that
while there may be several unstated purposes for the implementation
of the policy of excluding homosexuals from military service, actual
practice significantly impedes military functioning without accom-
plishing its stated purpose. Finally, the Article reviews court deci-
sions in an attempt to show that the judiciary is unlikely to save the
Department of Defense ("DOD") from itself by requiring a change in
policy. Thus, civilian DOD officials will have to decide whether or
not it would be in their and the nation's best interest to retreat by
altering the policy before the escalation of the guerrilla warfare that
gay and lesbian advocacy groups are now conducting.
II. THE EXCLUSION POLICY AND ITS EVOLUTION
Most disqualifications from military service involve either a
physical or educational deficiency.' Standards in these categories
fluctuate according to circumstance. If more recruits are needed,
standards are lowered; if fewer are needed, standards are raised.' The
law does not require general announcement of such changes. Even
during hostilities, as many as one in four young men may be consid-
ered educationally or physically unqualified.6
Citizens may also be disqualified for moral and administrative
reasons. A young person who has had a brush with the law, for
instance, may be barred from enlisting in the military.' In addition,
those who have radical political convictions can be disqualified if their
views are deemed "not clearly consistent with interests of national
security."" Homosexuality is also considered grounds for "moral and
administrative" disqualification.9
In the past, questions about homosexuality and military service
have focused on the involuntary discharge of service personnel. Now
questions are also being raised about denial of enlistment.'" The regu-
SECURITY RESEARCH AND EDUCATION CENTER, NONCONFORMING SEXUAL ORIENTATIONS
AND MILITARY SUITABILITY at A-9 (1988).
4. See NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON SELECTIVE SERVICE, supra note 2, at 203
(table 9.2).
5. See MARTIN BINKIN ET AL., BLACKS AND THE MILITARY 135-37 (1982); NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMM'N ON SELECTIVE SERVICE, supra note 2, at 201.
6. See BINKIN ET AL., supra note 5, at 98; NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON
SELECTIVE SERVICE, supra note 2, at 203.
7. Army Reg. 601-210 Update, Sept. 30, 1985, at 23.
8. Id.; see also Julian Bond, How the Draft Dodged Me, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1992 at 15.
9. Army Reg. 601-210 Update, supra note 7, at 23.
10. The number of homosexuals dismissed annually between 1985 and 1987 averaged over
1,500; this represented .1 to .2% of personnel. No statistics are available on denial of
enlistment to persons identified as homosexuals, but apparently an individual's declaration is
usually taken at face value. There is no certain way of knowing how to interpret these facts.
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lations that bar homosexuals from the military differentiate the pro-
fession of arms from that of the physician, the professional athlete, the
violinist, the lawyer, or the elected official. They also distinguish stu-
dents and church members from military personnel. In short, they
separate the military both from highly selective and from highly
inclusive groups. One might even say they make the military deviant.
The military's argument for barring homosexuals is that it is a
"special" institution."1 DOD Directive 1332.14 states:
Homosexuality is incompatible with military service. The
presence in the military environment of persons who engage in
homosexual conduct or who, by their statements, demonstrate a
propensity to engage in homosexual conduct, seriously impairs the
accomplishment of the military mission. The presence of such
members adversely affects the ability of the Military Services to
maintain discipline, good order, and morale; to foster mutual trust
and confidence among servicemembers, to ensure the integrity of
the system of rank and command; to facilitate assignment and
worldwide deployment of service members who frequently must
live and work under close conditions affording minimal privacy; to
recruit and retain members of the Military Services; to maintain
the public acceptability of military service; and to prevent breaches
of security. 2
A similar directive applies to officers.' 3 In addition, each of the
armed services has established regulations for its own forces based on
these directives. '4 Moreover, Uniform Code of Military Justice Arti-
cles 80, 125, and 134 in the Manual for Courts Martial provide for
criminal prosecution for actions related to sodomy, attempts at milita-
rily prohibited sexual activity, assault with intent to commit sodomy
(which includes heterosexual sodomy), indecent assault, and indecent
acts with another.' 5
Under each of the DOD Directives, a homosexual is defined as a
Does the minimal challenge to enlistment standards mean that there is no real attempt to
screen out homosexuals who wish to serve? Or, does the rate of dismissal mean homosexuals
are efficiently screened out, or that they do not seek to enlist, or that they are well closeted, or
known and tolerated? Or, does it only mean that they cannot easily be denied enlistment or
discharged against their will?
11. Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905, 454
U.S. 855 (1981).
12. See SARBIN & KAROLS, supra note 3, at A-9.
13. Id. at A-ll.
14. Id. at A-13.
15. Id. at 19-20, A-2 to A-7. Other tactics used to discharge homosexuals have been to
charge soldiers with fraudulent enlistment or conduct unbecoming an officer, and gentleman
(including women). Telephone Interview with Mary Newcombe, Attorney for Dusty Pruitt
(Feb. 10, 1992). See infra notes 152-59 and accompanying text.
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person who "desires to engage in, or intends to engage in," as well as
one who does engage in, homosexual acts.' 6 Homosexual acts are
defined as "bodily contact ... between members of the same sex for
the purpose of satisfying sexual desires." 7 The directives apply not
only to in-service violations, but to "preservice" behavior as well.'"
The policy is intended to leave no room for discretion or for excep-
tions. It prohibits conduct, excludes those whose status is that of
"homosexual," and even excludes individuals whose statements
demonstrate a propensity to engage in homosexual conduct. Thus,
even to "desire" or "intend" makes someone ineligible to enlist or
subject to discharge.19
Surprisingly, this highly inclusive, highly restrictive, mandatory
policy only dates back to 1981, when Reagan administration officials
apparently decided that having no discretion to retain a homosexual
would be preferable to having to make and defend individual deci-
sions related to enlistment and retention.2" Thus, the DOD's response
to the first serious, legal challenge to its discretionary power over the
service of gays and lesbians was to increase its inflexibility by
extending its definition of homosexuality and precluding any excep-
tions to its policy.2'
This is not to suggest that homosexuality has ever been officially
condoned by the United States military. Before World War II, the
military treated acts of sodomy as criminal offenses, punishable by
imprisonment. Still, although the services made no serious inquiries
into questions of homosexual identity, two unofficial policies permit-
ted the military to manage homosexuality without having to establish
an official policy on the subject. 22 First, vulnerable, effeminate men
16. SARBIN & KAROLS, supra note 3, at A-9.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Separation does not have to occur if the conduct is a departure from "usual and
customary behavior," "is unlikely to recur," "was not accomplished by use of force, coercion
or intimidation," and "the member's continued presence ... is consistent with the interest of
the Service in proper discipline, good order, and morale." Id. at A-9, A-10. Separation must
occur, on the other hand, if the "member has stated that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual
unless there is a further finding that the member is not a homosexual or bisexual." Id. at A-10.
20. The Reagan administration's pursuit of an airtight rule was a reaction to cases like
Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force, 591 F.2d 852, 859-60 (D.C. Cir. 1978), which held
that since the Air Force's regulation on homosexuality contained an exception to the overall
policy of separating homosexuals, there must be a reasoned explanation of an administrative
decision to involuntarily discharge an airman.
21. Ironically, at the same time the DOD adopted its strict rule, homosexual civilians were
experiencing some success in easing legal restrictions, and advocacy groups were increasingly
engaged in public education and political action.
22. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed
Forces, 38 UCLA L. REv. 499, 546 (1991).
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were either not inducted or forced to fail basic training. 23 This pre-
sumably eliminated homosexuals who fit the stereotype of being weak
and passive.24 It also eliminated those who were not homosexuals but
who might have been victimized by men who regarded abusing vul-
nerable individuals as proof of their own masculinity.25 Second, the
criminalization of sodomy worked to curb super- or hyper-masculin-
ity. By having the right to punish all homosexual acts, as well as
homosexual and non-homosexual rape, the military sidestepped the
need to consider "purpose" or "consent," or an individual's "nature."
The policies of eliminating potential victims and of criminalizing
exploitive behavior appear to have served the military's purpose up to
that time.
With World War II came the draft, the need to enlist large num-
bers of men, and arguments from the psychiatric community that
homosexuality should be treated as an illness rather than as a crime.26
Military officials argued that psychiatric screening for homosexuality
at the time of induction would create substantial cost savings, and
that discharge was usually better than jail, both for the military and
the homosexual service member .2  This decision to medicalize homo-
sexuality combined with the draft to bring thousands of men under
scrutiny. Draftees were certified as either heterosexual or homosex-
ual, and processed accordingly. At the same time that this "more
humanitarian" approach was being taken toward homosexuality,
efforts to prevent "malingering" caused discovered homosexuals to be
treated with revulsion. 28 Thus, while physicians had hoped to amelio-
rate the military's policy on gays by using a psychiatric framework,
other social forces, in particular the need to enlist large numbers of
men, combined with the psychiatric effort to produce an opposite
effect. The military labeled every potential inductee, and it imposed
severe informal sanctions on discovered homosexuals, who were later
discharged. 29 During the course of the war, 18 million Americans
23. Part of basic training is to secure subordination and compliance by terrorizing recruits.
See Ralph Schoenstein, Fort Dix Ph.D., N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1991, at A17. Drill instructors,
though, are supposed to train recruits, not eliminate them. Therefore, almost all recruits
complete basic training. One technique used to generate fear and compliance is by giving what
all know to be impossible commands. Another is to have one weak recruit who is, in fact, run
out, and whose ordeal serves as an implicit threat to other inductees. SOLDIER GIRLS
(Churchill Films, 1981).
24. ALLAN BERUBE, COMING OUT UNDER FIRE: THE HISTORY OF GAY MEN AND
WOMEN IN WORLD WAR Two 19 (1990).
25. Id. at 19-20.
26. Id. at 9, 10-22, 33.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 20.
29. In the case of women, homosexuality was considered more of an "environmental"
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were inducted; only 4 or 5,000 were rejected for homosexuality. 30
Clearly, little effort was made to open every closet door.
Again, the military's decision to define homosexuality as a medi-
cal problem both failed to rid the service of homosexuals and led to
the stigmatization of homosexuality. On the one hand, the military
tried to conceive of homosexuality as a form of mental illness to
increase efficiency.3' On the other hand, it did not want declarations
of homosexuality to become a way of avoiding service. The military
put research teams to work to uncover a screening device for weeding
out homosexuals while also figuring out a way to determine if and
how some homosexuals might be "salvaged." '32 These research efforts
did not meet with notable success. Indeed, researchers had difficulty
even creating a useful classification system for homosexuality. 33
Thus, while military policy continued to evolve, most homosexuals
managed to remain in service the conventional way-by remaining in
the closet.
One explanation for the military's apparently laissez-faire policy
toward homosexuality was the need for able-bodied men. Such pres-
sure makes any military less selective. Thus, by 1942 the Army
agreed to accept men previously rejected for venereal disease. By
1943 it inducted fathers. It also took Japanese Americans out of relo-
cation camps and enlisted African Americans in proportion to their
share of the population.34 By 1942 it also stopped "section eight-
ing''3  homosexuals who were doing their job well; a year later it dis-
charged them only if "rehabilitation" was "impossible." By the time
the war ended in 1945, discharged homosexuals were actually being
re-inducted as long as they had committed no "in-service" acts. 36
In his book Coming Out Under Fire, Alan Berube describes the
period during the early part of Word War II as simultaneously repres-
sive and liberating for homosexual servicemen.37 By "liberating" he
means that large numbers of young men were able to get together
away from home in a situation where traditional constraints were
problem. BERUBE, supra note 24, at 46, 142. In the Women's Army Corps ("WAC"),
discussion of homosexuality was more open, and members acknowledged the importance of
friendship and the value of hero worship, which could lead to high achievement. Id. at 47-50.
30. Id. at 33. About 10,000 more were discharged after induction Id. at 201.
31. Id. at 15.
32. Id. at 137, 152.
33. Id. at 15.
34. Id. at 179.
35. Section Eight of Army Regulation 615-360 permitted the discharge of men with
"undesirable habits or traits of character." Id. at 139.
36. Id. at 180.
37. Id. at 99.
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absent and borderline social behavior was expected.38 In the service
many gay men discovered themselves and each other. A homosexual
social life among troops developed in which cliques formed and
"camping" evolved as a survival technique. 39  "Swishes" and
"butches" amused and emotionally inspired both straight and gay
sailors. Still, the military's disapproval of homosexuality was well
known, and acting out could jeopardize a service member."°
In the postwar period tolerance ebbed.4" President Dwight
Eisenhower made "sexual perversion" grounds for disqualification of
civilians for federal employment and even for companies receiving
federal contracts. 2 Within the military, administrative discharges for
homosexuality became more frequent. The only protests registered
were appeals by non-admitters on due process grounds.43
Organized resistance to discrimination against homosexuals
began not in the military, but among civilians. The 1969 Stonewall
Bar "riot" in Greenwich Village is often used to mark the beginning
of active resistance to discrimination." Shortly after Stonewall, how-
ever, certain homosexuals who were in the military began to come out
and to challenge the exclusion policy. Leonard Matlovitch achieved
one of the first (partial) successes, and the decision in his case played
an important part in the genesis of the current policy.45
III. MILITARY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR BANNING HOMOSEXUALS
While there has been a considerable amount of public debate
even among uniformed personnel about the role of women in the mili-
tary, there has been little attention to the question of homosexuals.
With women, the discussion concerns "how many" and "doing
what." With homosexuals, however, there are none, doing nothing-
at least on the surface. Because someone cannot be a member of the
military and acknowledge being a homosexual, examples of homosex-
uals who have had distinguished military careers are limited to per-
sons fighting discharge. Also, to argue on behalf of homosexuals is
not only to dispute established policy, but also to invite suspicion
38. Id. at 98.
39. Id. at 86.
40. Id. at 91-92. Some gay soldiers who put on drag routines lost their cover and "were
exposed as queer." Id. at 91.
41. See id. ch. 10.
42. Id. at 269.
43. Id. at 274-75.
44. Id. at 271.
45. See supra notes 20-21; see also infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
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about oneself.46
The most common argument used by the military to justify its
exclusionary policy is that the presence of homosexuals poses a threat
to national security. Specifically, the military maintains that because
most gay men lead secret lives, they are vulnerable to blackmail. The
argument fails as soon as gay men can make their status public with
impunity. Moreover, the military has been unable to provide any evi-
dence to show that any homosexual soldier has been a security risk
with the exception of one Austrian "closet" case in World War 1.
4
1
The military's own reports-Crittenden in 1957 and Defense Person-
nel Security Research and Education Center in 1990-suggest that
security is a not an issue except for the fact that, as one scholar notes,
"Sanctions make rule-utilitarian justifications self-fulfilling
prophecies. 48
The public acceptance and recruiting arguments both disappear
in the presence of a draft. If one is told to go, one goes; indeed, one
would probably want most others to have to go, too. In the all-volun-
teer situation, one might look to college campuses, which are similar
to the military in that they enroll numerous young adults, but which
are dissimilar in that they do so without inquiring about private sex-
ual practices. Homosexuals are almost certainly present in all institu-
tions of higher learning, and many of them are public about their
orientation, performance, and status.4 9 Still, I know of no instance
where public acceptance of or enrollment at a college or university
has been affected by the presence of homosexuals. The military may
have a particular concern about having "effeminate" males dressed in
uniform, but that is a separate issue, since effeminacy is not an accu-
rate indicator of homosexuality.50
Another argument-the lack of worldwide deployability due to
privacy requirements-also fails to withstand scrutiny. The military
46. Interview with Martin Binkin, author of Blacks and the Military (March 14, 1990).
Even informal inquiries about the justification for the ban on homosexuals generally elicit only
vague responses, or formal responses drawn from Directive 1332.143. See supra note 12 and
accompanying text.
47. RICHARD D. MOHR, GAYS/JUSTICE: A STUDY OF ETHICS, SOCIETY, AND LAWS 198
(1988).
48. Id. Alluding to a recent grievous breach of security, Mohr notes: "After all, if the
Marines guarding the U.S. Embassy in Moscow had been sleeping with each other wouldn't
our national security have been ever so much better ofl?" Id. at 199. Secretary of Defense
Dick Cheney has referred to this concern as "an old chestnut." Eric Schmitt, Citing AIDS,
Judge Backs Ban on Gays Serving in Military, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1991, at A15.
49. Elizabeth Mehren, Northampton's Lesbians, Free to Be; in Mass. College Town, Women
Prosper Out of the Closet, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 1991, at Fl.
50. As Karst argues, public relations concerns about the ideology of masculinity are the
"central purpose of the exclusion of gay men." Karst, supra note 22, at 557.
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does not imply that any public sexual activity would necessarily take
place if homosexuals were allowed to enlist, but it does worry about
"stares in the shower." Apparently, men don't like being thought of
as sex objects, especially by other men.5" Whether or not stares cause
such discomfort, society has generally chosen to leave the problem of
scrutiny or mental undressing by members of the same sex to social
and peer control in YMCA's, sports clubs, or high school locker
rooms. The military has never explained why such controls would
not work in its situation, too. If sufficient privacy exists to allow
women and men to be deployed together, it would seem the same
would be true for heterosexuals and homosexuals. The problem may
be, simply, that men do not want to be seen as sex objects and not
know it. But if they do not know they are seen by other men as sex
objects, does it really matter?
The military also maintains that the presence of homosexuals in
the armed forces would threaten the integrity of rank and command.
This problem, however, can be managed by existing fraternization
policies, irrespective of gender. The increased presence of women has
provided the military with experience in the implementation of frater-
nization policies.
This is not to suggest that the military's concern with morale is
frivolous. Trust and confidence are certainly necessary between indi-
viduals who serve together, for only where trust exists is it possible to
predictably rely on one another. But trust and confidence develop not
from homogeneity, but shared experience. When individuals come to
military service who are different from each other in geographic ori-
gin, ethnicity, sex, and race, the military assumes the job of training
them to behave as a team. It has many powerful tools to develop
desired responses. Admittedly, the task of building trust among the
ranks is not easy, and the military has always been reluctant to
accommodate more difference than required. Nevertheless, the mili-
tary has successfully integrated both African Americans and women
in the armed services in the last fifty years.52 It has also developed an
elaborate individual evaluation system which makes it possible to
assess who does and does not deserve trust and confidence. 53 Barring
entire classes of people when the military has the ability to evaluate
trust and confidence on an individual basis is thus both wasteful and
unnecessary.
51. Panel discussion at the international Inter-University Seminar, in Baltimore, Maryland
(Oct. 11-13, 1991).
52. See Karst, supra note 22; Binkin, supra note 5.
53. See, e.g., STIEHM, supra note 1, at 168 (detailing criteria for the Weighted Airman
Program System).
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Finally, the need to maintain discipline, order, and morale needs
to be understood as a problem with more than one solution. One
approach is to exclude individuals who are scorned by other members
of the military. The problem with this approach is twofold: first, it
gives preference and power to the intolerant; and second, it under-
mines discipline and morale among those who decide they must lead
secret lives to survive. Moreover, the very process of investigating
and enforcing the discharge of homosexuals itself causes disorder that
threatens discipline and lowers morale.5 4 If, as the military suggests,
its concern about morale is basically an argument about efficiency,
then it should count all the costs. Further, it must also avoid expos-
ing itself to either side's deciding that it can "win" by raising the cost.
As in the case of fraternization, existing regulations governing harass-
ment can be used to control inappropriate behavior without any nec-
essary reference to gender.
During World War II, most people believed that homosexuals
simply were not fit for service." This was especially true of men who
fit a stereotype of being delicate, sensitive and slight.56 Interestingly
enough, poor performance is not one of the current justifications for
exclusion.5 7 Indeed, in a directive dated July 24, 1990, Vice Admiral
Joseph Donnell, commander of the Navy's Surface Atlantic Fleet,
suggested that although lesbians may be among the Navy's "top" per-
formers-they nevertheless must be "vigorously rooted out."5 8
A situation where the great majority of personnel "despise/detest
homosexuality"5 9 poses cohesion problems for the military and homo-
sexuals serving in it. Homosexuals run the risk of being isolated and
having others refuse to share living quarters and other facilities with
them." They also face the possibility of violence being directed
54. See MARY A. HUMPHREY, MY COUNTRY, MY RIGHT TO SERVE 45-46 (1988)
(detailing discharge of Naval officer).
55. BERUBE, supra note 24, at 19.
56. Id. Possible signs for identifying male homosexuals included "feminine bodily
characteristics," "effeminacy in dress and manner," and a "patulous [expanded] rectum." Id.
57. Unclassified administrative memo from Comnavsurflant to Alnavsurfiant, July 24,
1990 [hereinafter Memo]; see also Jane Gross, Navy Is Urged to Root Out Lesbians Despite
Abilities, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1990, at A9.
58. Gross, supra note 57, at A9.
59. Belier v. Mittendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 811 n.22 (9th Cir. 1980) (testimony of Assistant
Chief of Naval Personnel), cert. denied sub nom. Miller v. Weinberger, 454 U.S. 855 (1981).
60. In a recent hearing before the House Committee on the Budget, General Colin Powell
elaborated on the military's concern with the privacy needs of heterosexuals. "[I]t is difficult
in a military setting where their is no privacy, where you don't get choice of association ... to
introduce a group of individuals who are proud, brave, loyal, good Americans, but who favor
a homosexual life style, and put them in with heterosexuals who would prefer not to have
somebody of the same sex find them sexually attractive ... [to] ask them to share the most
private facilities together, the bedroom, the barracks, latrines, the showers." House Comm.
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towards them.6 While this violence might "only" involve fistifcuffs
or bashing, it could also involve sexual assault.62 Both arguments,
however, seem to fail under careful consideration. After all, if mili-
tary leadership, discipline, and training can lead men and women to
risk and sometimes even sacrifice their lives, as well as to take the
lives of others, that same leadership, discipline, and training should
certainly be able to train individuals to overcome their prejudice and
to refrain from violence against their peers.
Homosexual seduction of young recruits is another form of vic-
timization that concerns the military. Admiral Donnell specifically
referred to a "predator" type environment63 and to "subtle coer-
cion""M by lesbians. Coercion and seduction can be initiated by hetero
or homosexuals. However, such behavior is forbidden and appropri-
ately called either "harassment" or "fraternization." It should be
remembered that the age of young enlisted personnel is often a time of
experimentation, discovery, and revelation. Whatever the facts, it
would be easier for the folks back home to believe that a declaration
of homosexuality has occurred because of pressure or seduction than
it would be for them to believe that it has been either chosen or deter-
mined early in life by biological or environmental factors.
Apart from the arguments already discussed, the military has
offered little explanation for its supposedly "special" environment,
either in court or in policy statements.65 This leads one to wonder if
something more is involved in the exclusion of gays from the military,
some subtext which is not a part of the public debate.
IV. MILITARY PRACTICE RELATED TO HOMOSEXUALITY
Mary Ann Humphrey's My Country, My Right to Serve offers a
series of brief, highly personal accounts by homosexual veterans of
what is was like for them to serve in the military.66 She reports a
general belief that entire categories of military jobs were dominated
Hearing on the Budget, DOD Spending, 1993 Defense Budget, 102 Cong., 2d Sess. 112-13
(1992).
61. Karst, supra note 22, at 556; see also Lynne Duke, Homosexuals: Military's Last Social
Taboo, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 1991, at A6.
62. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. The concern about sexual assault applies to
rape committed by homosexuals as well as heterosexuals, many of whom do not consider the
active partner a participant in a homosexual act. MOHR, supra note 47, at 26.
63. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
64. Id.
65. According to one author, no official is allowed to defend the rules on the record. Jacob
Weisberg, Gays in Arms, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 16, 1990, at 2.
66. See HUMPHREY, supra note 54. The vignettes cover World War II through the late
1980s.
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by homosexuals, 67 even though there has never been any formal
acknowledgment of this as fact. Humphrey also describes regular
"purges" and "drumming out" ceremonies which led people to fur-
ther conceal their homosexuality, and, if accused, not to contest the
discharge.68 In Humphrey's volume, women's accounts tend to
emphasize the pain of leading a double life, while those of men con-
centrate more on disguises, games, meeting places, and impersonal
but readily available sex-reportedly with numerous "straight" men,
too.69 One woman who earned a purple heart and was an aide to
General Eisenhower said that she was directed by him to draw up a
list of homosexuals in the unit. The woman told the General her
name would be the first on the list, but was then corrected by his
secretary who said no, hers would be the first, since she would be
doing the typing. Both were then told by the General to "forget about
it." 70
Several men in Humphrey's book describe homosexual acts in
which an individual who does not consider himself homosexual domi-
nates another, considering this behavior to be "super macho. '71
Experienced officers acknowledge that this is a real, though hardly
prevalent phenomenon, giving rise to the phrase in the Marines, "fuck
me, suck me, but don't kiss me, I'm straight. ' 72 Homosexual exper-
iences seemed to be less of a concern at overseas posts,7a although
enforcement of the ban did-and does-go on.74
Critics of the military policy barring gay men and lesbians need
to remember that unlike civilians, military personnel enjoy no confi-
dentiality with a chaplain, counselor, or physician. At the same time,
though, officials in all bureaucracies have a high capacity for "not
knowing" what is well known. For instance, in the first year women
were admitted to the Air Force Academy, a cadet carried a fetus to
term without anyone "knowing" until she actually went into labor at
the Academy hospital.75 When investigations of alleged homosexual
67. Id. at 4.
68. Id. at 8-9.
69. Id. at 22, 95-96. One soldier who fought in Vietnam claimed without exaggeration to
have had sex with "99 percent of the guys in [his] barracks." Id. at 96.
70. Id. at 38-40.
71. Id. at 68.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 90 (discussing enforcement in Korea).
74. One female Marine pointed out the absurdity of enforcement, saying that "nobody
cared that you were gay." Id. at 186. Also, one marine wondered, "If they can't tell who we
are, how can we be a problem?" Id.
75. The cadet's plan, to have the child during spring break, missed by only a few days.
JUDITH H. STIEHM, BRING ME MEN AND WOMEN 209 (1981).
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service personnel do occur, they are often initiated not by a com-
manding officer, but by rejected lovers or other vengeful individuals.
Estimates of the number of persons discharged for homosexual-
ity between 1950 and 1970 run somewhere between 40,000 and
50,000.76 A General Accounting Office report showed 14,000 homo-
sexual servicemen and women released between 1974 and 1983.77
Data from 1985-1987 show nearly 5,000 released.71 Significant differ-
ences become evident when this data is examined as a percentage
within different personnel categories. The highest percentage of dis-
charges for officers is .02% per year for Navy men and women and
Air Force women. 79 For enlisted men the rate is .04 or .05%, except
for the Navy, which weighs in at. 13%. In every case, enlisted women
account for the highest number of discharges: Air Force, .1%; Army,
.17%; Navy, .27%; and Marines .33%.80
The numerous accounts of "witch hunts"-investigations that
treat large numbers of women as suspect and that frequently result in
purges of whole groups of women after prolonged periods of surveil-
lance and interrogation-appear to contrast sharply with the usual
practice of investigating and dismissing males as separate individuals,
and only when their behavior is so flagrant that it cannot be ignored.
The most well-known witch hunts are the Navy's investigations of the
U.S.S. Norton Sound in 1980 and the U.S.S. Yellowstone in 1988, and
the Marine's Parris Island investigation between 1986 and 1988.1 In
the latter case, almost half of the 246 women in a unit were ques-
tioned. Sixty-five of them subsequently left the Marines. 2
Michelle Benecke and Kirstin Dodge argue that these investiga-
tions are directly linked to new opportunities and experiences for
women. They maintain that women's entry into nontraditional occu-
pations leads men to defend their turf by trying to drive women out,
defining them as "not women" (i.e., lesbians), or trying to achieve
sexual access to demonstrate their continued male dominance.8 3 The
psychological dynamics Benecke and Dodge lay out are complex; still,
there is little doubt that women who undertake nontraditional jobs in
76. Rhonda R. Rivera, Queer Law: Sexual Orientation Law in the Mid-Eighties, Part II,
11 U. DAYTON L. REV. 275, 323 (1986).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. SARBIN & KAROLS, supra note 3, at B-2 to B-4.
80. Id.
81. See Michelle Benecke & Kirsten Dodge, Military Women in Nontraditional Fields:
Casualties of the Armed Forces' War on Homosexuals, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 215, 220-21
(1990).
82. Id. at 221.
83. Id. at 233-41.
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the military do experience special harassment. 4
Admittedly, the military is a large organization with different
services, occupations, assignments, and commanders with a good deal
of discretion. Individuals can have widely varying experiences and
perceptions of both the "reality" and the "practice" of homosexuals'
service to their country. What is self-evident, though, is that policy
and practice diverge, suggesting, perhaps, an unspoken purpose real-
ized by the current policy.
By DOD directive,85 the U.S. military proscribes service by
homosexuals. It also proscribes the commission of homosexual acts
by homosexuals and non-homosexuals.86 It even proscribes service by
individuals who have, or who claim to have, "homosexual tenden-
cies. "87 Exceptions are not permitted, although provision is made for
a one-time, youthful, non-coerced experiment (probably done while
intoxicated) and for individuals who say they are homosexuals but are
not.18 If this policy were actually enforced, it would deprive the mili-
tary of large numbers of effective personnel. Moreover, because it is
not systematically enforced, but could be enforced at any time against
84. Some believe that the sexuality and homosexuality of military women has become
more of a "problem" since men have fully taken over the command of women, and also since
women have begun to work in jobs once reserved to men. To command well, men will have to
develop an appreciation of women's culture, and also of what it is like to be a woman
submerged in a culture in which "male" is not well distinguished from "military." It is still
not clear why investigations of lesbians so often involve large numbers of women. Are
investigators out to "get them all?" Are the investigated more naive? Are women more
connected to each other? And, how appropriate are the charges and the findings? In the one
case I know well, that of the Norton Sound, 24 women, or one-third of all women assigned to
the unit, were originally accused. All African-American women were accused. Eventually
only eight were charged. Charges against four of these were dismissed. Two were cleared.
Only two were convicted-one of these, many believed, incorrectly. It must be noted, though,
that even those who "win" do not necessarily have an unblighted career or even the
opportunity to re-enlist.
The problem of lesbian-baiting also needs to be addressed. When women are in short
supply most men will have no access to them. To explain this without losing face, it is easy for
men to claim if a woman does date, that she is a whore, or if she doesn't, that she is a lesbian.
The person herself is irrelevant; the explanation is about the man's lack of success disguised as
lack of interest.
The problem is that being a lesbian is grounds for discharge. While perhaps not quite the
same as calling her a drug addict or thief, such casual assertations can have real consequences.
Women who stay in service are more likely to be childless and single than are men. In
nontraditional fields they may be especially confident and independent. If they have good
female "buddies" (a relationship which involves supposedly desirable bonding and cohesion),
they are especially vulnerable to such baiting. A good commander needs to police such
destructive language.
85. Hence the policy is civilian, not military, and administrative, not legislative, in origin.
86. See Memo, supra note 57; SARBIN & KAROLS, supra note 3, at A-9 to A-10.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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a particular individual, it creates an atmosphere of hypocrisy, secrecy,
fear, divisiveness, and homophobia among military personnel.
The policy also has a profound effect on the way in which the
civilian population views homosexuals. Because the military is such
an important national institution, it plays a major de facto role in
educating the public and shaping public attitudes about homosexual-
ity.89 When the military determines that homosexuality is salient to
and "incompatible" with service, it is in effect saying that there is
something wrong with being homosexual.
It is hard to assess the military's "special nature" argument
because the public statements concerning the argument simply repeat
the language of the 1981 directive. To many, including a number of
federal judges, the policy justifications for excluding gays from service
are just common sense. To others, they reduce to exclusion justified
by prejudice. The justification is that it is easier and more efficient to
accommodate prejudice than it is to eliminate or control it. Unfortu-
nately, an argument based on efficiency puts the military at the mercy
of troublemakers by encouraging both sides of the debate to be disrup-
tive. Thus, those who support a change in policy would have to con-
clude that the better strategy for overturning the current policy is to
make it more difficult for the military to exclude homosexuals than to
facilitate including them. Indeed, on a number of university cam-
puses, advocacy groups have brought the issue to the public's atten-
tion by staging demonstrations against campus ROTC and military
recruitment.' The exclusion also provides potential for enormous
inefficiency if the draft is reinstated and resisters use the exclusion
policy as a way to avoid service.
Thin justifications for the military's policy of excluding gays,
coupled with contradictions in practice, have led scholars like Ken
Karst to conclude that there is more to the policy than the military is
willing to acknowledge. Karst argues that the military is bound to an
ideology of masculinity that puts power and weapons in the hands of
"real men," and that in order to uphold this ideology, women and
homosexual men cannot be permitted to participate as equals.9' Lim-
iting and excluding these marginal groups enables the military to
89. The miliary's policy is educational in the sense that it provides the civilian community
with "authoritative" definitions of homosexuality and homosexual acts. At one time concern
focused on acts; these were defined as criminal. Later, a shift occurred toward thinking of
homosexuality as a mental illness. BERUBE, supra note 24, at 15. Since being dropped from
the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, homosexuality has
been regarded as a preference or orientation.
90. Larry Tye, Campus ROTC: Target Revived, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 3, 1991, at Al.
91. See Karst, supra note 22, at 557.
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maintain and exploit the gender line, but more importantly, makes it
possible for most men to accept the extraordinary subjection required
of them by the military without protest. That is, just by being in and
eligible for combat, enlisted men are made to feel superior to the
majority of the population they are fighting to defend.92
Let us assume that many homosexuals have served, are serving,
and will continue to serve in uniform. 93 Some will be well-closeted.
Others will be known but not "out." Still others will be discharged or
denied reenlistment. Some of these will endure great pain and humili-
ation. All, however, will be at constant risk of being accused or found
out.94
What, then, if anything, does the policy accomplish? The real
goals of the policy seem to be twofold. First, since the military clearly
does not want to eliminate all homosexuals from service (they are too
numerous and valuable to be actually excluded), the policy seeks to
make them invisible, to keep them from asserting their identity and
from making too much noise. Servicemen and women should not
appear too butch, or too effeminate, and any participation in homo-
92. Id. at 579. That the actual purpose of the policy is something other than what the
military claims is demonstrated by the military's failure to achieve its stated goals of keeping
women out of harm's way and of keeping homosexuals out of the military. Id.
I have concluded that the exclusion policy has been developed primarily with the
stereotypical gay identity in mind, and that it has simply been extended to lesbians. Thus,
early doubts about the "fitness" of male homosexuals have never been directed toward female
homosexuals. Nor has it been suggested that lesbians will become victims, or isolates. Indeed,
if anything, the contrary has been suggested in each instance.
93. It is estimated that male homosexuals serve in the military in about the same
proportion they subsume of the population as a whole, and that women homosexuals serve in a
somewhat higher proportion. See SARBIN & KAROLS, supra note 3, at C-5. However, one
might expect differences in a volunteer, as opposed to a drafted military. One author claims
that 37% of men and 13% of women have had "some" homosexual experience-that is,
enough to disqualify them from military service. DAVID A. WARD & GENE KASSEBAUM,
WOMEN'S PRISON 95 (1965). Even if one adopts a narrow construction of homosexuality and
a conservative estimate of their participation in the military, one would have to estimate that 3
to 10% (60,000 to 200,000) of those now serving would not be if the exclusionary policy could
be and was fully enforced. For further statistics on homosexuality in the military, see SARBiN
& KAROLS, supra note 3, at C-I to C-5.
94. The extent to which enlisted personnel are at risk of being exposed and discharged for
being homosexual depends on a variety of factors. Different branches of the service have
adopted different attitudes about the importance of enforcing the policy. See supra notes 80-
105 and accompanying text. Moreover, enforcement appears to be more strict for enlisted
than non-enlisted personnel, perhaps because they are younger and less experienced with
concealment, or perhaps because they have less privacy. In addition, enforcement for women
more often includes extensive witch hunts with accusations, interrogations, and divisive
practices. Benecke & Dodge, supra note 81, at 222. Finally, the degree of risk depends on the
strictness of the policy in force. Presently, the policy on homosexuality is very rigid. During
World War II, however, known homosexuals were retained and even reinducted if they could
be "rehabilitated." Berube, supra note 24, at 33.
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sexual acts must be private. Thus, the total exclusion policy is actu-
ally a potent tool for requiring invisibility. If someone serves at the
discretion of others, the threat of discharge, be it honorable, general,
or dishonorable, is a powerful weapon for controlling his or her
behavior. But it seems the military wants something more than sim-
ply to root out homosexuals. It also wants to eliminate effeminate
males from the ranks, even if they are not homosexuals. This is based
partly on image, but it also appears to be based on a concern about
sodomy. In a hyper-macho environment, some non-homosexuals
believe that sodomizing other men is a means of demonstrating their
masculinity. Literature abounds on this practice in United States
prisons,95 and while the military is certainly not a prison, it is an
extremely isolated and hierarchial environment in which coercion and
compliance are frequently required. The United States public may
continue to tolerate, albeit reluctantly, what are essentially male rapes
in prisons, but it is unlikely to do so in a citizen army. Thus, the
military makes an effort to exclude potential victims and to prohibit
all homosexual acts.96
The following chart summarizes apparent practice as it relates to
the exclusion policy. It indicates that the military seeks exclusion for
heterosexuals who are so hyper-macho as to commit homosexual acts,
and for those who appear effeminate. The military also seeks exclu-
sion for all homosexuals who have "come out." Those who are clos-
eted are excluded only if their appearance is stereotypical.
95. One study estimates that 9% of heterosexual men are assaulted in prison. WAYNE
WOODEN & JAY PARKER, MEN BEHIND BARS 239 (1982). Another author believes that race
is a factor in prison rapes. DANIEL LOCKWOOD, PRISON SEXUAL VIOLENCE 37 (1980).
96. The military's policy also eliminates any need to consider whether there was consent to
a particular act, and prevents homoerotic actions which might be stimulated by desired male
bonding.
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ACTS WORDS IDENTITY APPEARANCE
IN INCLUDE INCLUDE INCLUDE EXCLUDE
HOMOSEXUALS
OUT EXCLUDE EXCLUDE EXCLUDE EXCLUDE
EXCLUDE INCLUDE EXCLUDEHETEROSEXUALS (IIYPER- (SERVICE (POTENTIAL
MACHO) AVOIDESV ICTIMS)
A military organization strives for uniformity and compliance-
that is why military personnel wear uniforms. It is not tolerant of any
form of individualism or separateness-an understandable impulse
given its mission. However, inclusion, rather than exclusion, is an
essential element of a citizen army which enjoys broad, strong sup-
port. A democracy expects shared risks. Thus, it is to the nation's
advantage if its military can successfully, as a matter of course, inte-
grate homosexuals. To do so will require setting aside military claims
that homosexuals are a "special case." It will also require setting
aside the assertion that the military can train citizens to kill and die,
but cannot teach them to be respectful of one another. Conversely,
homosexuals may have to submit to a certain degree of social control
if they are to participate effectively in military service.
V. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE EXCLUSION OF HOMOSEXUALS
FROM THE MILITARY
Since the mid-1970s, a number of homosexuals have challenged
their military discharges in civilian courts. Plaintiffs in two of the
cases have won partial victories, but others have been unsuccessful in
securing relief. A brief description of the cases and issues developed
in them and an estimate of the usefulness of further litigation follows.
Note that the concern here is not "the law," but rather, mechanisms
or tactics that can assist in altering existing policy. Thus, instead of
organizing the text around legal concepts as they have developed
through cases, the discussion treats the cases separately as though
each were an initiative for change. Note also the advantage gained by
challenging exclusion that results from dismissal, rather than exclu-
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sion that results from the refusal to permit enlistment. Already being
in service makes it possible to argue good performance. This also
weakens DOD arguments that the mere presence of homosexuals con-
tributes to a lack of discipline and morale.
In Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force,97 a decorated Vietnam
veteran and non-commissioned officer named Matlovich "came out"
to his superiors and was discharged.98 Matlovich appealed on
grounds of privacy. The court held that the service's policy of exclud-
ing gays was constitutional, but since the policy did provide for excep-
tions in certain cases, Matlovich was entitled to an explanation of why
the exception did not apply to him.99 When the Air Force failed to
act, the court ordered Matlovich to be reinstated."° In December
1980, Matlovich settled for money (a partial victory), but the Depart-
ment of Defense subsequently rewrote its regulation to remove the
exceptions and the possibility of a defense based on quality of per-
formance. 101 The overall result of this challenge, paradoxically, was
to increase restrictiveness.
In Belier v. Middendorf,'0 2 three enlisted members of the Navy
admitted to homosexual acts but sought to stay in the service. 0 3 One
of the defendants had been in the Navy twenty years; another had
been in service for fifteen years."° The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, refused to invalidate the
Navy's regulation prohibiting homosexual conduct. Rejecting the
plaintiff's claim that private consensual acts are constitutionally pro-
tected under the Due Process clause, the court held that "[t]he nature
of the employer-the Navy-is crucial to our decision [to uphold the
regulation]." 10 5 The court's opinion, written by Anthony M. Ken-
nedy, now a Supreme Court justice, also reached the conclusion that
there was no requirement to judge particular applications of the mili-
tary regulation, and that, in fact, any "less broad prohibition . . .
97. 591 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
98. Id. at 854.
99. Id. at 859.
100. Matlovich, 591 F.2d at 854.
101. Note that regardless of homosexual conduct or statements, provision is made for
retaining individuals if it is found that the member is not in fact homosexual or bisexual.
Memo, supra note 57, at A-12.
102. 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Miller v. Weinberger, 454 U.S. 855
(1981).
103. Id. at 793.
104. Id. at 793-94. In one case, the plaintiff's superior officers up to the level of the Chief of
Naval Personnel had recommended retaining him. Id. at 794.
105. Id. at 810. Interestingly, the court singled out the Navy, in its opinion, rather than
referring to the military as a whole.
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might be understood as tacit approval" of homosexuality. 106 Further,
the court held that the Navy could rationally conclude that the pres-
ence of homosexuals "would create tensions and hostilities, and that
these feelings might undermine the ability of a homosexual to com-
mand the respect necessary to perform supervisory duties."10 7
In a blistering dissent attacking the court's refusal to rehear the
case en banc, Judge William Norris argued that the Beller panel "was
easily seduced," and that "[iut accepted without critical scrutiny the
Navy's statement of its interests and the importance of those inter-
ests." 0 8 He claimed that the Navy had done nothing to indicate that
"war-readiness requires that the private lives of Navy members meet
the approval of other members, citizens of host nations, or the Navy
itself," and that "intolerance is not a constitutional basis for an
infringement of fundamental personal rights.' Yet intolerance, or
a presumption of intolerance, "is at the very root of each of the dan-
gers which the Navy asserts is posed to its interests by homosexu-
als." 10 The Supreme Court denied certiorari."I Norris remained the
lone dissenter, but an eloquent proponent of the position that irra-
tional fear does not justify discrimination.' 1 2
Another case, Dronenburg v. Zech," 3 involved an enlisted man
who was dismissed after admitting to numerous and repeated homo-
sexual acts in military barracks with younger enlisted men. 1 4 The
court held that Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond,115
which upheld a Virginia statute criminalizing private consensual
homosexual acts, was controlling with regard to any right to privacy
the defendant might have. 1 6 As to the question of equal protection
and whether or not the Navy regulation was rationally related to an
end the Navy was entitled to pursue, a three judge panel found:
To ask the question is to answer it. The effects of homosexual con-
duct within a naval or military unit are almost certain to be harm-
ful to morale and discipline. The Navy is not required to produce
106. Id. at 811.
107. Id. at 811-12. The court also concluded that allowing gays in the Navy might hamper
recruiting efforts. Id. at 811.
108. Miller v. Rumsfeld, 647 F.2d 80, 87 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981).
109. Id. at 88.
110. Id.
111. Beller v. Lehman, 452 U.S. 905 (1981).
112. For further discussion of the Navy's policy on homosexuality, see MOHR, supra note
47, at 193. Mohr labels the principle that current discrimination is not a reason to establish
good faith discrimination the "oscar wilde [sic]" principle. Id. at 193.
113. 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
114. Id. at 1389.
115. 525 U.S. 901 (1976).
116. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1391-92.
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social science data or the results of controlled experiments to prove
what common sense and common experience demonstrate.'
17
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit denied the defendant's motion for rehearing en banc, but not
without arousing a scathingly critical dissent, which accused the
majority of throwing down a "gauntlet" to the Supreme Court on the
privacy issue." 8 The dissent also noted that with so many women
now in the military, the issue of sexual conduct among members of a
unit is not restricted to the issue of homosexuality, and that
mandatory dismissal is not a proper remedy for every heterosexual act
of fraternization or harassment." '9 The case was not appealed to the
Supreme Court, leaving intact the judiciary's policy about homosexu-
als in the military. 12
0
Watkins v. United States Army,' 2' probably the best known case
on homosexuality in the military, was the other partial victory. At
the time he first enlisted in 1967, Watkins had marked "yes" on the
form asking if he had homosexual tendencies. 22 While in the service
he was openly gay and performed in drag shows. 23 He was initially
investigated in 1968 for homosexuality, honorably discharged at the
expiration of his enlistment in 1970, readmitted in 1971, investigated
in 1972, readmitted in 1974, investigated in 1975, investigated in
1979, readmitted in 1979, and, finally, after the new 1981 regulations
were put in place, discharged.' 24 The decision to discharge him in
1981 was based on his 1967 admission that he was a homosexual.
25
A civilian court enjoined the discharge, finding that the proceedings,
which were a repeat of the 1975 proceedings, constituted double jeop-
ardy.' 2 6 Watkins reenlisted again in 1982 while the case was appealed
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
127
A number of factors argued in Watkins' favor. First, Watkins
had consistently received high ratings and the support of individuals
117. Id. at 1398. The court also noted the special dangers inherent in a situation where
military superiors hold coercive power over their inferiors, "enhanc[ing] the possibility of
homosexual seduction." Id.
118. 746 F.2d 1579, 1580 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
119. Id. at 1581. The dissent noted that the Navy currently handles problems arising from
heterosexual relations on a case-by-case basis. Id.
120. Rivera, supra note 76, at 316.
121. 837 F.2d 1428 (1988), reh'g en banc, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, Ill S.
Ct. 384 (1990).
122. Id. at 1429.
123. Id. at 1430.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1431.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1432.
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with whom he worked.12 Second, unlike prior plaintiffs, who argued
that military restrictions on homosexuality violated their right to pri-
vacy, Watkins based his claim on an alleged violation of his Fifth
Amendment right to equal protection-that is, that the new regula-
tion forbade not just homosexual acts but even homosexual status or
"orientation."' 29  To support Watkins' claim, the court had to find
that: (1) individuals with a homosexual orientation were discrimi-
nated against as a class; (2) homosexuals constituted a "suspect" class
and, therefore, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation merits
"strict" scrutiny; and (3) the government's action was not "necessary
to serve a compelling governmental interest" and thus did not meet
the criteria for strict scrutiny. 130
The court also had to distinguish Watkins from Bowers v. Hard-
wick, 13 the landmark Supreme Court decision which held that homo-
sexuals have no constitutional right to engage in consensual
sodomy. 32 The Ninth Circuit found Hardwick, a substantive due
process case, to be distinguishable from Watkins, which was based on
equal protection.133 However, rehearing the case en banc, the Ninth
Circuit found for Watkins only on grounds of estoppel. The Supreme
Court denied certiorari,134 and Watkins received retroactive pay,
retirement benefits, and an honorable discharge. 135  The result was
that while Watkins scored a personal victory, the case had no real
effect on broader military policy.
Plaintiffs have also challenged the military's exclusionary policy
128. While the Army's appeal of the district court injunction was pending, Watkins
received 85 out of 85 possible points on an evaluation of his performance and professionalism.
Id.
129. Id. at 1434.
130. Id.
131. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
132. Id. at 190. The Hardwick case, decided by a 5-4 majority, upheld a Georgia state law
criminalizing sodomy. Id. at 196. After leaving the court, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., who
had voted with the majority, indicated that he thought he "probably made a mistake" in not
voting to apply the Constitutional right of privacy to consensual homosexual relations. Linda
Greenhouse, When Second Thoughts in Case Come Too Late, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1990, at
A 14.
133. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 837 F.2d 1428, 1448 (1988), reh'g en banc, 875 F.2d 699 (9th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 384 (1990); see also Hatheway v. Secretary of the Army, 641
F.2d 1376 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981). The issue in Watkins concerned not
acts and privacy, but sexual orientation and class discrimination. Watkins, 837 F.2d at 1448.
Even after considering the deference owed military regulations, the court found that the
Army's justifications "illegitimately" catered to private biases. Id.
134. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
384 (1990).
135. See Linda Greenhouse, Gay Soldier Wins Battle to Re-enlist, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5,
1990, at A16.
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on First Amendment grounds. In BenShalom v. Marsh,136 Miriam
BenShalom, an Army Reserve sergeant, won reenlistment at the dis-
trict court level, under the First Amendment right to free speech as
well as an equal protection claim as a member of a suspect class . 37
The military notably made no allegation that BenShalom had engaged
in actual homosexual conduct either before or during her military ser-
vice.' 38 Instead, it argued that its 1981 regulations disqualified her
from service.' 39 The Army eventually reinstated her at the direction
of the court. 140 However, seven months after her reinstatement, Ben-
Shalom's enlistment expired, and she was denied reenlistment on the
basis of the new regulations and the statements which had been used
against her in her 1976 unlawful discharge case.' 4 ' BenShalom
appealed, requesting reenlistement, and the court again upheld Ben-
Shalom's challenge, declaring Army Reserve Regulation AR 140-111,
Table 4-2, "constitutionally void on its face."' 4 2 Victory was brief,
however; BenShalom ultimately lost at the appellate court level. 43
Another resounding rejection of both the privacy and equal pro-
tection arguments, and a potent reaffirmation of the special deference
argument, occurred in Woodward v. United States.'44 Woodward was
an officer who had acknowledged homosexual tendencies at the time
of his enlistment. 45 Later he was recommended for discharge after
he was seen socializing with an enlisted man who was being dis-
charged for homosexuality. 46  The United States Claims Court
denied Woodward's for back pay and reinstatement. 47
The Federal Circuit affirmed. Relying on the Supreme Court's
opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, 48 the court refused the argument that
Woodward's homosexuality was protected under the constitutional
136. 703 F. Supp. 1372 (E.D. Wis.), rev'd, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub
non, BenShalom v. Stone, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1373. This was actually BenShalom's second case. The first had been a test of
her 1976 dismissal from the Army because of her (homosexual) status. BenShalom v.
Secretary of Army, 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980), aff'd, 826 F.2d 722 (7th Cir. 1987).
The courts had ordered her reinstated in 1980, but the military took no action until 1987-
eleven years after her dismissal. BenShalom v. Marsh, 703 F. Supp. at 1373.
139. BenShalom v. Marsh, 703 F. Supp. at 1374.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1373.
143. BenShalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom. BenShalom
v. Stone, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990).
144. 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990).
145. Id. at 1069.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1070-71.
148. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
1992]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
right to privacy.' 49 The court also relied on Hardwick to deny that
homosexuals constitute a class subject to heightened scrutiny under
the constitutional right to equal protection. 150 Finally, the court
noted that "[s]pecial deference must be given by a court to the mili-
tary when adjudicating matters involving their decisions on discipline,
morale, composition and the like."''
The most recent case concerning homosexuality and the military,
Pruitt v. Cheney,'52 was designed to test the prohibition against a per-
son's admission of homosexual orientation. The case was presented as
a free speech issue. No acts were involved, and Pruitt was not on
active duty.153 Pruitt lost at trial level. The court noted in its opinion
that
[i]t makes little difference whether a person has committed homo-
sexual acts, or would like to do so, or intends so to do .... [T]he
Army understandably would be apprehensive of the prospect that
desire or intent would ripen into attempt or actual perform-
ance. . . . It is not for this Court to assess the wisdom of the
Army's policy .... "'
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit took three years after hearing oral
arguments before handing down its decision. When it did, it again
confirmed that First Amendment free speech rights were not abridged
by the military's homosexual exclusion policy. The court did hold,
however, that the Army had not demonstrated the rational basis for
its regulation, and that Pruitt had the right to argue that the Army
had violated the Equal Protection Clause.' 55 The new element in this
decision is the application of Palmore v. Sidoti,'56 which struck down
a denial of child custody to a divorced mother based on social disap-
proval of her second marriage to a man of a different race,1 57 and City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,'5' which held that there was no
149. Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1074-75.
150. Id. at 1075-76. The court noted that Hardwick permitted the criminalization of the
"the most common sexual practices of homosexuals." Id. at 1076 n. 10 (citing Hardwick, 478
U.S. at 188 n.1, 196). Because "'there can hardly be more palpable discrimination against a
class than making the conduct that defines the class criminal,' " the court reasoned that, under
Hardwick, the military's discrimination against homosexuals is constitutional. Id. at 1076
(quoting Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
151. Id. at 1077.
152. 943 F.2d 989 (9th Cir. 1991).
153. Pruitt v. Weinberger, 659 F. Supp. 625, 627 (C.D. Cal. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part sub nom. Pruitt v. Cheney, 943 F.2d 989 (9th Cir. 1991).
154. Id.
155. Pruitt v. Cheney, 943 F.2d 989, 996 (9th Cir. 1991).
156. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
157. Id. at 434.
158. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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rational basis for requiring a home for mentally retarded persons to
obtain a special permit when other care facilities required no such
permit.' 59 Thus, the issue of discriminating against individuals
because others are prejudiced against them was decided quite differ-
ently than in Beller, and is sure to play an important part in the next
set of arguments.
Another recent applicable decision, Steffan v. Cheney,16
involved the forced resignation of a Naval Academy midshipman who
admitted his homosexual orientation just weeks before graduation.' 6 '
Steffan challenged the constitutionality of the Pentagon's ban on
homosexuals, arguing that the regulation violated his rights of free
speech and association, due process, and equal protection.162 The
District Court dismissed the case after Steffan refused to respond to
deposition questions during discovery about whether or not he had
engaged in homosexual acts. 163 The Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit reversed, holding that because Steffan had not been charged
with homosexual conduct by the Navy, the Navy was not entitled to
discovery on that issue.' 64 The case was remanded back to the Dis-
trict Court, which held that the regulations were rationally related to
the state's interest in protecting soldiers and sailors from AIDS. 165
VI. CONCLUSION
This brief synopsis of caselaw spanning the last decade and a half
offers little hope that the federal courts will provide relief to those
disqualified or rejected from military service on the basis of their
homosexuality or participation in homosexual acts. 66 Arguments
about quality of performance, privacy, equal protection, and free
speech have all been heard and rejected by the judiciary. Often the
military's arguments have been accepted without question. Mean-
while, legal scholars continue to mount intellectually elegant chal-
lenges to the military's exclusionary policy, 67 although Chief Justice
William Rehnquist's doctrine of military deference makes these
159. Id. at 455.
160. 733 F. Supp. 121 (D. D.C. 1984), rev'd, 920 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 122.
163. Id.
164. Steffan v. Cheney, 920 F.2d 74, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
165. Federal Judge Upholds Military Ban on Gays, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 10, 1991, at 14A.
166. The only possible opening would appear to be a decision based on Palmore and Pruitt,
prohibiting discrimination because of others' prejudice. See supra notes 152-57 and
accompanying text.
167. See Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915, 918 (1989) (arguing that "sexual
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efforts seem somewhat futile. 68
If the Department of Defense is willing to admit that homosexu-
als are used when they are needed, as they were recently during the
Persian Gulf conflict, then it seems both fair and possible to give them
the opportunity to serve in peacetime. Indeed, if, as the military sug-
gests, there must be experimentation in order to manage a newly visi-
ble minority before routinely integrating its members into the ranks of
service personnel, it seems better to conduct that experimentation
now, rather than during wartime.
There are already policies for maintaining discipline and morale
in the face of special relationships. They include policies on sexual
harassment, fraternization, rape, and pubic displays of affection. In
recent years the military has gained extensive experience in managing
special relationships between heterosexuals. There is no reason why it
cannot do so with relationships between homosexuals, and do so with-
out gender-specific policies. The military is superb at solving
problems by modifying behavior. It is unworthy of an institution of
such high caliber to seek to solve a "difference problem" by catering
to the prejudices of some citizens by excluding others.
identity is produced by social interaction, and that activity of production is so fundamental...
that, under the mandate of the equal protection clause, courts are obliged to protect it.").
168. Karst notes that "[i]n the last two decades the idea that judges have virtually nothing
to say about any issue involving the military has grown like a weed." Karst, supra note 22, at
564. He distinguishes deference based on judicial incompetence or the military as a "separate
community" from deference based on emergency needs, noting that the former was developed
largely by Chief Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 568.
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